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Azlgzlstine on Theological Fatalism: 
The Argzlment of De Libero Arbitrio 3.1-4 
DAVID P. HUNT 
Whittier College 
Recent critiques of theological fatalism-the position that divine foreknowl- 
edge is incompatible with creaturely freedom-have tended to attach them- 
selves to one or  another of the analyses put forward by various medieval 
thinkers. The latter include Boethius, Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham, and (un- 
der a sufficiently generous conception of 'medieval') Molina.1 Notable by 
his absence from this list is St. Augustine, whose De Libero Arbitrio is perhaps 
the Ur-text for the problem as it arises within a specifically theistic context. 
Work on this article was begun while I held a Research Fellowship at the Center 
for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame. Special thanks are owed 
to the Society of Christian Philosophers, for inviting me to present an earlier 
version of the article as the opening address at the 1995 Pacific Regional Meeting, 
and to John Fischer, Bill Hasker, and Eleonore Stump, for useful comments on the 
penultimate draft. 
1. The sheer number of critiques that draw on these figures is too great for me 
to do more than offer a few examples here. For Boethius, see Eleonore Stump and 
Norman Kretzmann, "Eternity," Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981): 429-58; and Brian 
Leftow, "Timelessness and Foreknowledge," Philosophical Studies 63 (1991) : 309-325. 
For Scotus, see Anthony Kenny, The God of the Philosophers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1979), chap. 5; and Martin Davies, "Boethius and Others on Divine Foreknowl- 
edge," Paci$c Philosophical Quarter4 8 (October 1983): 313-29. For Ockham, see 
Marilyn McCord Adams, "Is the Existence of God a 'Hard' Fact?" Philosophical Reuiew 
76 (October 1967): 492-503; Joshua Hoffman and Gary Rosenkrantz, "Hard and 
Soft Facts," Philosophical Review 93 (July 1984): 419-34; Alvin Plantinga, "On Ock- 
ham's Way Out," Faith and Philosophy 3 (July 1986) : 235-69; and William Lane Craig, 
'William Ockham on Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingency," Pa@c Philo- 
sophical Quarterly 69 (June 1988) : 117-35. For Molina, see David Basinger, "Divine 
Omniscience and Human Freedom: A 'Middle Knowledge' Perspective," Faith and 
Philosophy 1 (July 1984): 291-302; and Alfred J. Freddoso, "Introduction," Luis de 
Molina, On DivineFmeknowledge (Part N o f  the "Concmdia'7, trans. Alfred J. Freddoso 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988). There is no single Thomistic approach 
since Aquinas has a number of resources available for responding to the problem, 
but especially noteworthy is the "Thomistic Ockhamism" found in William P. Alston, 
"Does God Have Beliefs?" Religious Studies 22 (September/December 1986): 
287-306; and Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, The Dilemma of Freedom and Fmeknowkdge 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), chap. 3. 
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Whereas Augustine is often cited respectfully when the problem itself is
raised, he is virtually ignored when the time comes to offer a solution to the
problem—unless, of course, he is being featured in a cautionary tale about
how not to avoid theological fatalism.2
The reasons for such treatment are not far to seek. There has been a
considerable advance in our understanding of the problem during the last
thirty years, owing largely to attempts to grapple with Nelson Pike's land-
mark essay "Divine Foreknowledge and Voluntary Action."3 Viewed in that
light, Boethius et alii can be seen to anticipate (at least inchoately) what are
now regarded as the crucial nodes in the argument, whereas Augustine
appears to have missed them altogether. For one thing, Augustine seems
unclear about the real origin and nature of the necessity by which divine
foreknowledge threatens future actions. Because there is no unequivocal
recognition by Augustine of the important distinction between simple and
conditional necessity (as there is in his near contemporary Boethius), it is
not surprising that he fails to identify the strongest form of the argument
as one that involves simple necessity and so misses the crucial role played
by the pastness of God's beliefs (which generates the simple necessity) and
the essential inerrancy of those beliefs (which transfers that necessity to the
future, making divine foreknowledge problematic in a way that human
foreknowledge is not). 4 For another thing, Augustine seems unclear what it
is about free agency that is really threatened by this necessity. It is now
recognized that only the robust power-to-do-otherwise endemic to the lib-
ertarian conception of freedom is at risk;5 Augustine, however, often sounds
like a compatibilist, and even when he doesn't, the reader may be under-
standably reluctant to attribute full-blooded libertarianism to someone who
could write at the end of his life, "On the solution to this question I tried
hard to maintain the free decision of the human will, but the grace of God
was victorious."6 Finally, it is unclear just what solution Augustine means to
offer in De Libero Arbitήo. Whereas the relevant chapters contain a couple of
fairly crisp statements of the problem, the ensuing discussion has a complex
and confusing dialectical structure and that part of it that is most readily
isolable as a solution to the problem is (so construed) straightforwardly
question begging.7 It is no wonder that recent efforts to clarify the dilemma
of foreknowledge and freedom have looked elsewhere for their inspiration.
2. See, for example, Plantinga, Όckham's Way Out," pp. 235-36.
3. Nelson Pike, "Divine Foreknowledge and Voluntary Action," Philosophical
Review 74 (January 1965): 27-46.
4. Pike argues in the last section of his article, "Divine Foreknowledge," that
Augustine is "instructively incorrect" on these two points.
5. For discussion of this issue and the constraints it imposes on solutions to the
problem, see William P. Alston, "Divine Foreknowledge and Alternative Concep-
tions of Human Freedom," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 18 (1985):
19-32.
6. Retractationes2Λ.
7. The reference is to bk. 3, chap. 3, 32-35.
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I shall argue, however, that this assessment of Augustine's position
rests on a misreading of the text and that his escape from the dilemma,
far from constituting a dead end, is actually quite plausible—certainly
more so than the usual summary dismissal of his argument would suggest.
I happen to think that it is also superior to those of the medieval and
modern luminaries who have followed him; but a defense of this claim
with respect to each of Augustine's competitors would obviously be impos-
sible in a single article. I shall settle instead for some brief concluding
remarks on the relevance of Augustine's solution to the contemporary
post-Pikean phase of the debate.
It is in chapter 2 of book 3 that De Libero Arbitήo first broaches the problem
of theological fatalism, but it is important to begin our analysis with chapter
1, where a larger issue is raised and crucial assumptions are made. The work
as a whole is devoted to the general question, What is the cause of evil? And
the general answer it offers is free choice of the will. Book 3 tests this answer
by examining some of the more problematic conditions under which free
choice must operate, conditions that include the Fall, as well as the exist-
ence of an all-knowing God.
The examination is inaugurated in chapter 1 by Evodius's opening
query: "What is the origin of that movement by which the will [uoluntas]
is turned away from common and immutable goods, and toward goods
of its own or those of others, that is, the lowest goods and every kind of
transitory good?" (3.1.1).8 His reason for asking, he explains, is that "if
free will has been given in such a way that this movement is natural to
it, then it is turned to lesser goods by necessity. There is no blame to be
found where nature and necessity rule [natura necessitasque dominatur]"
(1.2). This is the first and most important of a series of statements in
this chapter that set forth logical connections between key concepts, and
it is worth formulating these connections as we go along so that we can
refer to them easily. Once the formal relations between the concepts are
made explicit, we can appeal to these relations (along with other clues
from the text) in illuminating the content of the concepts.
Letting 'W' stand for any movement of the will away from immutable
8. The translation used throughout is from the Library of Liberal Arts, On Free
Choice of the Will, trans. Anna S. Benjamin and L. H. Hackstaff (New York: Macmil-
lan, 1964). Section numbers (which follow book and chapter numbers in my
citations) are taken from the text edited by William M. Green, Sancti Aureli Augustini
opera: De libero arbitήo libή tres (corpus sariptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum, vol. 74)
(Vienna: 1956).
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goods and toward transitory goods, Evodius's explanation of his interest in
"the origin of that movement" involves two claims:
(1) W is natural —> W is necessary;
(2) (W is necessary . W is natural) —> ~(W is blameworthy).9
Augustine next gets Evodius to admit that such a movement is undoubtedly
blameworthy, upon which Augustine himself draws out the consequence:
"You should have known with certainty that the movement does not lie in
the nature of the will, since you are so certain that it deserves blame" (1.4).
This principle is affirmed three more times in the chapter, once in the
contrapositive, when Evodius says of the natural downward motion of a
stone, "It is not right to blame it because of the fact that the movement
arose naturally" (1.7). So let us add
(3) W is natural —> ~(W is blameworthy).
This is not, of course, a separate premise since it follows from (1) and (2);
but it is worth special note given the number of times that Augustine sees
fit to give it distinct and explicit recognition in the course of the chapter.
Augustine then extends the implicatory chain to include the voluntary,
avowing that "this movement by which the will is turned from immutable to
transitory goods . . . is voluntary and therefore blameworthy [uoluntaήum et
ob hoc culpabilem]" (1.11), a principle for which Evodius supplies the con-
verse in the chapter's final sentence: "If the movement by which the will is
turned this way and that were not voluntary and within our power [uolun-
taήus atque in nostra positus potestate], we could not be praised when we turn
toward higher things, or blamed when, as if on a pivot, we turn toward lower
ones . . ." (1.13).10 Taken together, we get
(4) W is blameworthy <-> W is voluntary.
9. It should be noted that an alternative reading, which replaces (2) with
(2') [W is necessary —> ~(W is blameworthy)] . [W is natural —> ~(W is
blameworthy) ],
may also be compatible with the passage from 3.1.2. But all else being equal, (2) is
preferable on the grounds that it is both weaker than and also entailed by (2')
Moreover, everything else is not equal since there is evidence disconfirming (2')
First, there is no independent passage in which Augustine affirms the entailment
of the blameless by the necessary, whereas there are several in which he affirms the
entailment of the blameless by the natural—an odd imbalance if his intention is to
endorse both conjuncts of (2') Second, he later (chaps. 2-4) employs "necessity
talk" in cases in which he thinks blame is clearly appropriate, making it doubtful
that he would want to assert in chap. 1 that necessity simpliάter does entail blame-
lessness. All things considered, (2') must be rejected in favor of (2).
10. For parallel passages in bk. 2, see 2.1.7, "Both punishment and reward
would be unjust if man did not have free will," and 2.19.200, "This turning away and
turning toward result in the just punishment of unhappiness, because they are
committed, not under compulsion, but voluntarily."
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(Of course the full biconditional is not true for every movement of the will
but only for those, like W, in which the movement is from better to worse.)
Finally, we have
(5) W is natural —> ~(W is voluntary).
Like (3), this is not a separate premise, but it follows from the other
premises; it also acquires independent support from the contrast between
W and the movement of a stone, which Augustine elaborates in the middle
section of the chapter. Augustine asks Evodius to consider "the movement
with which the stone by itself swerves toward the earth and falls" (1.6),
reminds him of their conclusion in book 1 that the will cannot be com-
pelled by anything external (1.8), and notes that the falling stone and W
are alike in that "as the one movement belongs to the stone, so the other
belongs to the spirit" (1.9). They differ, however, in that "the stone does not
have it in its power to check its downward motion, whereas so long as the
spirit does not will to neglect higher goods and love lesser ones, it does not
move in that direction" (1.9). It is because of this difference in power that
"the movement of a stone is natural, while that of the spirit is voluntary"
(1.10). This assignment of the natural and the voluntary to mutually exclu-
sive categories is ample evidence that the discussants are not only commit-
ted to (5) but also aware of that commitment.11
Given that (l)-(5) are securely grounded in the text, what implications
does this have for Augustine's own position on these matters? Assertions
collected willy-nilly from the text prove little: those attributed to Evodius are
certainly suspect, while even those attributed to Augustine are not ipso facto
trustworthy—a judgment that rests less on a tendentious deconstructive
wedge between Augustine and "Augustine" than on the fact that a common
and effective response to dubious assumptions is to accept them for the sake
of argument and then show the absurd consequences that follow from
them. In the case of (l)-(5), however, there is little doubt that we are
face-to-face with Augustine's own position. His major speech in the first part
of the chapter, in the course of which he appeals to premises (l)-(3),
begins with the words "Let us examine why this truth [that W is blamewor-
thy] . . . is so indubitable" (1.3)—an astonishingly duplicitous move if
Augustine in fact rejects one or more of these premises. The remaining
premises make their appearance in Augustine's longest peroration of the
chapter, where they are supported by principles "established" (1.8) in book
1 and a dissenting opinion is said to be "simply insane" (1.10). In face of
11. For a single passage setting forth most of the connections in (l)-(5), see
De Duabus Animabus Contra Manichaeos 12.17: "Whatever these souls do, if they do it
by nature not will, that is, if they lack a movement of the mind free both for doing
and for not doing; if in fact they are not granted the power of refraining from
operating, we cannot maintain that a sin is theirs."
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such language it is impossible—perhaps even insane—to regard (l)-(5) as
anything other than the considered views of their author.
These views are noteworthy in two respects. First, they settle the ques-
tion whether Augustine is an incompatibilist, at least in one important
sense: the natural is incompatible with the blameworthy and thus with the
voluntary. Second, they conspicuously fail to settle the question whether
Augustine is an incompatibilist in another sense: while both the conjunction
of the natural and the necessary, as well as the natural alone, are said to be
incompatible with the blameworthy, nothing is said about whether the
necessary alone is incompatible with the blameworthy; nor can this question
be decided by anything that can be inferred from the pronouncements in
this chapter [as it would be, e.g., if the text anywhere licensed the converse
of (1), something that it pointedly fails to do].
This omission makes the necessary appear superfluous. If Augustine
does not presuppose in chapter 1 that necessity entails blamelessness, it is
unclear what role necessity is playing in the argument. What is the point of
insisting that the conjunction of the natural and the necessary entails the
blameless if the natural by itself entails the blameless? Why doesn't he just
start off with premise (3) and leave the necessary out of it altogether? This
problem disappears as soon as we look for the role of necessity, not in its
contribution to the truth-functional work of the argument, but in its elabora-
tion on what makes (3) true. Of the various properties that are characteristic
of the natural, necessity is the one that is connected to blamelessness; nor is
it simply generic necessity that is so connected, but the particular kind of
necessity endemic to the natural. Call this kind 'natural necessity'. What (1)
and (2) add to (3), then, is the idea that the natural is characterized by
natural necessity [premise (1) ] and that it is in virtue of natural necessity that
the natural entails the blameless [premise (2) ]. This reading not only solves
the major problem for (2) but also is supported by two other passages in
which the notion of natural necessity is expressly employed. The first is this:
"I deny, however, that the soul is to be blamed .. . if its nature is such that it is
moved by necessity [si eius natura talis est ut eo necessaήo moueatur] "(1.5). Note
that he is not denying blame in just any case in which necessity is at work but
only in that case in which the necessity reflects the nature of the thing. The
second passage confirms this: "It is not right to blame it because of the fact
that . . . it is driven by the necessity of its own nature [naturae suae tamen
necessitate compellitur]" (1.7). Though both of these comments are put in the
mouth of Evodius, there is nothing to suggest that Augustine does not en-
dorse them as well.
Before leaving chapter 1, something should be said about the term
Voluntary' as it is occurring at this point in Augustine's exposition. Its
meaning comes into focus only gradually as the argument proceeds into
chapters 2-4, and I have therefore left it largely a cipher thus far, except
insofar as its interpretation is constrained by the (charitably construed)
truth of (4) and (5). It is important, however, to know whether Augustine
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is using the term here in a "minimal" or a "maximal" sense. There are places
where Voluntary' appears to mean little more than ."in accordance with
will"—for example, in chapter 3, where Augustine rebuts the view that "we
do not will anything voluntarily" (non uoluntate aliquid uelimus) on the
grounds that, even though happiness is not something that lies completely
within our power, nevertheless "when you are to be happy, you shall not be
happy against your will [inuitum], but because you will [uolentem] to be
happy" (3.28). This minimal sense may also be present in chapter 1 to some
degree, but it is hard to see this as the sense reflected in (4) and (5). For
one thing, the network of relations into which Augustine places the volun-
tary in 1.8-13 (where voluntaήus occurs four times and voluntas nine times)
is richer than a minimalist conception can sustain. These relations include
not only (4) and (5) but also the "tests" by which Augustine demonstrates
these propositions: that W be genuinely of (occurring in and belonging to)
the subject ["it belongs to the spirit alone" (1.11)], that W be approved by
the subject ["we accuse a spirit of sin when we prove that it has preferred
to enjoy lower goods" (1.10)], and that W lie within the subject's power
["the stone does not have it in its power to check its downward motion"
(1.9)]. One or more of these strictures may be satisfied by the minimal
sense of 'voluntary' (perhaps the second test just is the minimal sense and
so is satisfied trivially), but the total package surely requires more than the
minimum. For another thing, the passages that support premise (4) reca-
pitulate discussions in book 2 of the volitional conditions for human re-
sponsibility (praiseworthiness and blameworthiness). Those discussions,
more consistently than in book 3, identify what is at stake not just as willbut
also as free will or free choice oί the will. The most plausible view, then, is that
the references to the voluntary in 1.8-13 are an abbreviation of the more
robust liberam uoluntatem with which book 3 begins and by which it is
connected to the discussion of human responsibility in book 2.
In sum, the business of chapter 1 is to identify the threat to human
responsibility and free choice of the will posed by a specific kind of neces-
sity: natural necessity. If the will were moved by natural necessity, its move-
ment would be neither blameworthy nor voluntary. There is nothing,
however, to suggest that the threat is a live one. In the first place, no reason
is given for thinking that W is ever characterized by natural necessity; this
being the case, the orthodox Christian can grant that the natural entails the
blameless and happily proceed with modus tollens, denying blamelessness
and thereby denying that the will is moved by natural necessity (something
he or she might want to deny in any case).12 In the second place, nothing
is said about whether other (more likely) forms of necessity pose a similar
threat: if a thing does what it does by nature, this endows its activities with
12. This is, in fact, the other main business of chap. 1: Evodius's insisting
indignantly on his commitment to the blameworthiness of a sinful will, and
Augustine's pointing out the consequences of this stand for the thesis that the will
is moved by natural necessity.
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a kind of necessity that is inimical to responsibility, but it is an open question
at this point whether, other kinds of necessity have the same consequence.
II
This preliminary discussion leads directly to the challenge posed by theo-
logical fatalism. The argument setting up this challenge is stated twice, the
first time by Evodius at the beginning of chapter 2:
Since this is so, I am deeply troubled by a certain question: how can
it be that God has foreknowledge of all future events, and yet that we
do not sin by necessity [necessitate]? Anyone who says that an event can
happen otherwise [aliter euenire aliquid posse] than as God has
foreknown it is making an insane and malicious attempt to destroy
God's foreknowledge. If God, therefore, foreknew that a good man . .
. would sin, the sin was committed of necessity [necesse erat id fieri],
because God foreknew that it would happen. How can there be free will
[uoluntas libera] where there is such inevitable necessity [ineuitabilis
necessitas]} (2.14-15)
"You have knocked vigorously at the door of God's mercy," Augustine
responds. "May it be opened to those who knock" (2.16). Augustine then
devotes the remainder of chapter 2 to expatiating on the proper method
of knocking. "A great number of men are tormented by this question," he
says, "for no other reason than that they do not ask it in the right way,
but are too swift to excuse their sins, instead of confessing them" (2.16).
For such people it is an open question whether we sin voluntarily and so
responsibly, a question whose answer hinges on the success of the argu-
ment for theological fatalism (such people may even have an ulterior
motive for taking the argument's conclusion seriously). But Evodius is
evidently not among these men ["I have no doubt that you are already
persuaded of this" (2.20), Augustine says], and theological fatalism can
only raise for him an "aporetic" difficulty: it cannot threaten his belief that
the will is free, it can only threaten his understanding of how it can be
free.13 It is this second threat that remains for Augustine to defuse, and
he closes chapter 2 by asking Evodius to "observe how easily I shall answer
such an important question for you after you have given a few answers to
my question" (2.20).
13. Evodius's difficulties in the dialogue are typically aporetic in this sense. In
bk. 2, for example, he says of God's wisdom in giving men free will, "Although I
believe this with unshaken faith, nevertheless I do not understand it" (2.11). This
is, of course, the attitude of "faith seeking understanding," which Augustine sanc-
tions in bk. 1, chap. 2.
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It is perhaps owing to this extended excursus on the dialectical situ-
ation that Augustine feels the need to open chapter 3 with a restatement of
Evodius's aporetic difficulty:
Surely this is the question that troubles and perplexes you: how can
the following two propositions, that God has foreknowledge of all
future events, and that we do not sin by necessity but by free will [non
necessitate, sed uoluntate], be made consistent with each other? "If God
foreknows that man will sin," you say, "it is necessary that man sin." If
man must [necesse] sin, his sin is not a result of the will's choice
[uoluntatis arbitήum], but is instead a fixed and inevitable necessity
[ineuitabilis et fixa necessitas]. You fear now that this reasoning results
either in the blasphemous denial of God's foreknowledge or, if we deny
this, the admission that we sin by necessity, not by will [non uoluntate sed
necessitate]. (3.21-22)
There are minor differences in wording and emphasis between this formu-
lation and Evodius's in chapter 2, and even within a single formulation a
variety of expressions is used for the key concepts. Necessity, for example,
is adverted to a total of nine times under nearly as many locutions.14 And
what is it with which necessity is supposed to conflict? Is it the existence of
uoluntas libera (Evodius at 2.15), the supposition that uoluntate peccemus
(Augustine at 3.21), the idea that sin arises from uoluntatis arbitήum
(Augustine again at 3.21), or all three? (Whichever it is, some species of the
robust sense of 'voluntary' from chapter 1 is surely what is at issue here.)
Since Augustine clearly regards the diversity of formulations as contributing
toward a single argument, let us set aside these differences for the moment
and represent this common argument as follows:
(PI) W is foreknown (by God) —> W is necessary
(P2) W is necessary —» ~(W is voluntary)
Λ W is foreknown (by God) —> ~(W is voluntary).
If the argument is sound, its conclusion leaves the theist with the unpalat-
able option of affirming the antecedent (and losing free will) or denying
the consequent (and losing divine foreknowledge). Since the argument is
formally valid, it can be defeated only if one of its premises is false or if it
commits an informal fallacy, the most likely candidate for the latter being
an equivocation on its middle term, 'necessary'.
Which of these critiques we are predisposed to find Augustine pursuing
in his response to the argument may depend on how we understand chap-
ter 1 and its connection with the chapters that follow it. A careless reading
14. These are Evodius's locutions: necessitate peccemus, [non] aliter euenire aliquid
posse, necesse erat id fieri, ineuitabilis adparet necessitas', and these are Augustine's:
necessitate. . . peccemus, necesse est ut peccet, autem necesse est, ineuitabilis etfixa necessitas,
necessitate peccaή.
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of chapter 1 could easily suggest that Augustine is committed to (P2) and
that his analysis of theological fatalism will therefore issue in some indict-
ment of (PI). The virtue of this reading is that it makes the connection
straightforward: chapter 1 establishes the second premise in the argument
for theological fatalism, and chapter 2 adds the first premise and shows what
follows when the two premises are combined. Its vice, as we saw, is that the
posited connection simply does not exist: what is licensed by chapter 1 is
(5) W is natural —> ~(W is voluntary),
wheras (P2) is conspicuous by its absence. A better reading recognizes this
but still finds the connection in (P2), understanding its use of'necessity' as
an abbreviated reference to the natural necessity of chapter 1; thus (P2) is
again supported by (5) and Augustine's solution will have to be found in his
analysis of (PI), which is either straightforwardly false or else true in a sense
other than that established in chapter 1. But there are two problems with this
position, one exegetical and one logical. The exegetical problem is that
'natura and its cognates, which figure so prominently in chapter 1, are
completely absent from chapters 2-4. This can hardly be an oversight: it is
much more plausible to suppose that Augustine is signaling a new phase in
the discussion than that he is continuing to employ the same concept of
necessity while dropping all the characteristic locutions by which he formerly
designated it. The logical problem with this reading is that a refutation of
Evodius's argument would patently fail as a refutation of theological fatalism.
If (P2) did no more than threaten human responsibility with natural neces-
sity, the argument could be refuted by showing that divine foreknowledge
does not bring foreknown actions under that kind of necessity. Since there is
absolutely no reason to think that divine foreknowledge entails natural ne-
cessity, Augustine would be setting up a straw man whose demolition would
leave intact the possibility that divine foreknowledge entails other forms of
necessity that are equally destructive of human responsibility. The question
of theological fatalism would therefore remain wide open.
If we refrain from reading (P2) as synonymous with (or at least implied
by) (5), we have to understand the connection with chapter 1 in a wholly
different manner. The following seems to me to be the most plausible way
to do this. Chapter 1 presents a threat that one species of necessity poses
for free will. It's a purely theoretical threat, as there is no reason to think
that we do what we do or will what we will by natural necessity, nor is any
reason so much as hinted at in the text; but Augustine's investigation of the
threat is nevertheless useful in that it shows what a successful threat looks
like and sets forth the standards by which success is to be measured.
Chapters 2-3 then present a threat that another species of necessity poses
for free will. This one is not a merely theoretical threat, at least for the
orthodox theist, since divine foreknowledge provides at least some reason
for thinking that human actions are indeed governed by a species of
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necessity; but in investigating this new threat Augustine can look to chapter
1 for a model of how to proceed. We can then expect him to show in chapter
3 how the threat from foreknowledge and its associated necessity fails to
meet the standards laid out in chapter 1.
Ill
Chapter 3 is generally regarded as the heart of Augustine's response to
theological fatalism, and it has consequently attracted the bulk of critical
attention. I think this assessment is mistaken and the attention misdirected.
Chapter 3, it must be said, is the most difficult of the four chapters under
consideration (perhaps of the book), and I don't have a reading that makes
perfect sense of it in the minutest detail. I don't know anyone who does;
there's enough slippage in Augustine's usage of key terms that a completely
coherent reading is probably impossible. But I do think that the broad
picture is as follows.
First, Augustine nowhere denies (PI); to the contrary, he explicitly
recognizes a sense in which (PI) is true. In chapter 2, as we saw, Evodius
says of the objects of God's foreknowledge that they are "committed of
necessity [necesse erat id fieri]" (2.15), assigns them "inevitable necessity
[ineuitabilis ... necessitas]" (2.15), and denies that they "can happen other-
wise [aliter euenire aliquid posse]" (2.14). These characterizations may be
suspect because they come from the initial statement of the problem;
Augustine, however, adds others in chapter 3 that are clearly meant to be
accepted, such as that "nothing happens otherwise [non potest aliud fieri]
than as God foreknew" (3.30); that what God foreknows is "certain [certά]"
(3.29), "cannot be otherwise [nee aliter aliquid fieri possit]" (3.28), and "will
more certainly be present [ certior aderit]" (3.35); and finally, that "whatever
God foreknows must come to be [necesse essefieri quaecumquepraesciuitDeus]"
(3.36). Borrowing a phrase from chapter 4, where the pattern continues,
we might say that Augustine regards the objects of God's foreknowledge as
necesse enim certa (4.38), or "necessary because certain."15
Second, Augustine also declares a sense in which (P2) is true. The
expression he uses repeatedly throughout chapter 3 to designate the neces-
sity that is inimical to human responsibility is non uoluntate sed necessitate, I
read this phrase, not as suggesting that necessity in general is opposed to
the voluntary [a suggestion that would contradict point (1) and the evi-
dence supporting it], but as a cue that 'necessity'—which is associated with
a variety of meanings in Augustine—should here be read in such a way that
15. The entire passage from which this phrase is distilled goes as follows: "Immo
necesse esset utpeccaret. Non enim aliter esset praescientia mea nisi certa praesάrem"
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the voluntary is excluded.16 Chapter 1 showed that naturae suae necessitate!?,
non uoluntate sed necessitate. The question posed in chapter 3 is whether
necesse enim certa is also non uoluntate sed necessitate.
Third, Augustine's answer to this question is negative: while there is a
sense in which (PI) is true, and also a sense in which (P2) is true, there is no
single sense of 'necessary' in which both these premises are true. The argu-
ment can therefore be said to fail through equivocation. This is in fact the way
Augustine presents the matter at the beginning of De CivitateDei 5.10, where
he distinguishes a sense of necessity that opposes free choice but does not
characterize our wills from one that does characterize our wills but does not
oppose free choice. In De Libero Arbitήo 3.3, in contrast, his tendency is to
disequivocate the argument in such a way that (PI) is true and (P2) is
false .This is shown, for example, when Evodius summarizes what has been
accomplished at the end of chapter 3: "I no longer deny that whatever God
foreknows must [necesse] come to be, and that he foreknows our sins in such
a way that our will still remains free in us and lies in our power" (3.35). First,
he affirms that divine foreknowledge entails necessity—that is, he has been
brought to see that this is not the place that the argument goes wrong.
Second, he denies that divine foreknowledge excludes free choice of the will.
Given these two conclusions, it must be that necessity does not entail the
absence of free will, and he was wrong to link them unreflectively in his
original formulation of the argument. This makes Augustine's analysis of the
problem very different from that of most recent opponents of theological
fatalism, who tend to construe (P2) or its equivalent as true and then argue
that (PI) is (in that sense) false.17
16. Thus I differ from William Lane Craig, "Augustine on Foreknowledge and
Free Will," Augustinian Studies 15 (1984): 41-63, who maintains that "Augustine
equates necessity with causal necessity and opposes it to freedom and voluntary
action" (p. 49) and, again, that "Augustine seems to use 'not voluntarily' and 'by
necessity' as synonyms" (p. 50).
17. In fairness I should also cite the passage that is thought by some (e.g.,
William Craig) to constitute the strongest evidence for a contrary reading according
to which Augustine sees (PI) as false and (P2) as true:
Augustine. See, please, how blindly a man says, "If God has fore-
known my will, it is necessary [necesse] that I will what God foreknows,
since nothing can [potest] occur except as he has foreknown it. If,
moreover, my act of will is subject to necessity [necesse], we must admit
that I willed it not by will, but by necessity [non iam uoluntate, sed
necessitate]." Strange foolishness! How could it be that nothing happens
otherwise than as God foreknew, if He foreknows that something is
going to be willed when nothing is going to be willed? I pass over the
equally astounding assertion that I just said this man makes: "It is
necessary that I will in this way." By assuming necessity, he tries to
exclude will. If it is necessary that he will, how can he will, if there is no
will? (3.30-31)
A careful reading, however, shows this passage to be far less damning than it
appears. It begins with another statement of the argument for theological fatal-
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Fourth, Augustine arrives at this position on the argument by applying
various tests to W under the supposition that it is necesse enim certa. It is useful
in understanding the logic of Augustine's argument to think of these tests
as supplying necessary conditions for free will, though Augustine may not
have thought of them precisely in this way. It is not even clear that
Augustine thought of them as distinct tests: at times they appear to be
distinct, while at other times the distinctions appear to collapse. With this
caveat in mind, however, there should be little harm in identifying three
tests at work in chapter 3: (a) whether W belongs to or is located in the
subject ["God's foreknowledge . . . does not take from you the will to be
happy when you begin to be happy" (3.29) ], (b) whether W is approved by
the subject ["When we will, if the will itself is lacking in us, we surely do not
will" (3.32); this is the minimal sense of'voluntary'], and (c) whether W lies
within the subject's power ["Nor can it be aΛvill if it is not in our power"
(3.34)]. These are the same three tests we identified in chapter 1, though
they yield a more favorable result for necesse enim certa in chapter 3 than for
naturae suae necessitate in chapter 1.
ism. The partisan of this argument is said to be blind and foolish, but there is
nothing at this point to suggest that it is commitment to (PI) that makes him so.
Augustine's response to the argument comes in two parts. The first employs the
rhetorical schema "How could it be that M, if N?" The answer to this rhetorical
question is, of course, "It can't!" But whether this answer counts against M ("noth-
ing happens otherwise than as God foreknew") or against N ("He foreknows that
something is going to be willed when nothing is going to be willed") depends on
which is being used to undercut the other. Since N is clearly objectionable, it can't
be used to undercut M, and (PI) therefore survives this first phase of Augustine's
analysis. [While M lacks the modal force of (PI), it also lacks the modal force of the
principle actually employed in the stultitiam singularem under discussion, namely,
"nothing can occur except as he has foreknown." This principle, to which M is
clearly an abbreviated reference, both packs the requisite modal punch and also
entails (PI).] ' '
The second part is the toughest for my interpretation, since it extends the
opprobrium to the necessity claim as well. But which necessity claim? Notice that the
claim Augustine labels "astounding" is nowhere asserted in the argument; rather, it
forms the consequent of the conditional that plays the role here of (PI) and the
antecedent of the conditional that plays the role of (P2). Is it astounding in both
places or only in one? What is wrong with it, Augustine says, is that "by assuming
necessity he tries to exclude will." This is what (P2) does; so it is at least arguable
that (P2) is the astounding claim while (PI) gets off scot-free. The last part of the
passage can then be read this way: "If it is necessary that he wilί," then both (a) he
wills (since necessity entails actuality) and (b) he does not will-(since the objector
understands necessity to exclude will). But this is a contradicticfri: "How can he will,
if there is no will?" So we must reject either the initial supposition that it is necessary
that he will or the objector's interpretation of that supposition a"s excluding will.
Since the passage itself leaves this choice open, it does not force any"reassessment
of the evidence in other passages that Augustine construes (PI) as true and (P2) as
false.
For a diametrically opposed reading of this passage, see Craig, "Augustine on
Foreknowledge," p. 55.
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Fifth, this result is unsatisfactory because it is one that a compatibilist
or "soft determinist" could accept; it therefore fails to establish how divine
foreknowledge can coexist with libertarian free will. This is not to say that
Augustine shows himself to be a compatibilist in chapter 3. Whether he does
so is a much disputed question, which I suspect to be ultimately unresolv-
able, inasmuch as it comes from anachronistically foisting upon Augustine
a distinction that is important to us but may not have been important to
him. 1 8 (Perhaps it should have been; but that does not mean that it was.) It
is not, however, anachronistic to go in the other direction and ask whether
Augustine's solution might be relevant to our own dilemmas, which require
careful attention to the distinction between compatibilism and incompati-
bilism. The evidence for this in chapter 3 is not very encouraging.
Since necesse enim certa cannot affect Augustine's two nonmodal tests
for free choice—that W belong to the subject and that it be at least mini-
mally voluntary—let us skip over Augustine's discussion of these and move
directly to the modal requirement that W lie within our power. Augustine
offers a conditional analysis of this requirement: something X is in our
power if and only if its coming about depends on our will, that is, if there
is some act of willing such that (a) were we to engage in that act of willing,
X would come about, and (b) were we not to engage in that act of will-
ing, X would not come about.1 9 Now if power is defined in terms of willing
in this way, then it is trivially true that willing itself is always in our power.
If X = dying, growing old, or being happy (to take Augustine's examples),
there is no act of willing such that (a) and (b) are both true; but if X =
willing that Y> there is some act of willing such that both counterfactuals
are true, namely, the act of willing that Y. On this account, which places
the will in our power by definition, divine foreknowledge cannot possibly
18. For a sampling of critical disagreement on the Augustinian view of free will,
compare these two judgments: "Man is a puppet, free in the sense only of being
arranged to act in a way which is not subject to external pressures"—John M. Rist,
"Augustine on Free Will and Predestination," Journal ofTheological Studies 20 (Octo-
ber 1969): 440; and 'The will is not free merely in the sense that its choices are not
externally coerced, but also in the sense that, confronted with two options, it has
the power to choose either one"—Craig, "Augustine on Foreknowledge," p. 44. Or
consider this pairing: "Augustine's view of free will amounts to liberty of spontane-
ity. It is not so much the ability to do otherwise, as the ability to act free of
compulsion or constraint"—Gerard O'Daly, "Predestination and Freedom in
Augustine's Ethics," in Philosophy in Chήstianity, ed. Godfrey Vesey, Royal Institute of
Philosophy Lecture Series, vol. 25, supp. Philosophy (1989), p. 96; and "There can
be no doubt that Augustine generally demanded for sinners more freedom than
the first, 'slight' degree [i.e., liberty of spontaneity] All men have two-way power,
and exercise it in some of their voluntary actions"—Christopher Kir wan, Augustine,
The Arguments of the Philosophers (London and New York: Routledge, 1989): 84,
88.
19. Cf. De Spiήtu et Littera 31.53: "We say there is power, when to the will is joined
the possibility of doing. Hence someone is said to have in his power what he does
if he wills, and does not do if he wills not to."
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jeopardize this power. Suppose God foreknows that I will will to sin and
that my willing will issue in the sinful act. This is compatible with the act
being in my power, that is, with it being the case that were I to refrain from
willing, I would not perform the act; it is also compatible with the will
being in my power, i.e., with it being the case that, were I to refrain from
willing, I wouldn't will. So W continues to pass all of Augustine's tests
for free agency even when divine foreknowledge is introduced into the
equation.
Augustine's procedure here raises the critical question of whether he
has really fulfilled any part of his obligation to show that the.will is free in
these circumstances. Augustine evidently thinks that he has: "Our will,
therefore, is not a will unless it is in our power. And since it is indeed in
our power, it is free in us" (3.33). Christopher Kirwan rightly complains
that Augustine "is altogether too cavalier about the distinction of will from
free will,"20 a judgment that can be confirmed in the present case by taking
Augustine's "power test" for free will and using it to show that W is free
even when causally necessary. Suppose it is causally determined that I will
will to sin and that my willing will issue in the sinful act. Again, it may be
true that were I to refrain from willing I wouldn't sin (since the sinning
was causally dependent on the willing) and it is certainly true that were I
to refrain from willing I would refrain from willing. But to conclude from
this that either the sinning or the willing was in my power, even though
both were causally determined, reflects a sophistical view of power that no
libertarian would accept. This means that Augustine's analysis in chapter 3
will not be helpful in resolving the contemporary post-Pikean version of
theological fatalism, for which libertarian freedom is part of the puzzle
conditions.
Sixth and last, it is a mistake to look to this chapter for Augustine's final
word on the matter. [This is fortunate indeed, given point (5).] When
Evodius sums up the chapter with the admission "I no longer deny that
whatever God foreknows must come to be, and that he foreknows our sins
in such a way that our will still remains free in us and lies in our power,"
there is an air of conclusiveness about his statement that makes it tempting
to think that the problem has been solved and that it has been solved in
chapter 3. But the conclusiveness is evidently a chimera since the discussion
continues in the next chapter in response to Evodius's confession that he
"still cannot see how God's foreknowledge of our sins can be reconciled with
our free choice in sinning" (4.37). This should not be at all surprising. It's
unclear that Evodius ever really denied what he says he no longer denies;
at least Augustine has been assuming all along that his problem is a purely
aporetic one. By building up his confidence in the compatibility of divine
foreknowledge and free will, chapter 3 has made the problem more than
20. Kirwan, Augustine, p. 101.
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ever an aporetic one.21 But the aporia nevertheless remains. By having
Evodius explicitly avow "that whatever God foreknows must come to be,"
Augustine implicitly traces the aporia to (P2), leaving it right where it was
when Evodius closed his formulation of the argument in chapter 2 with the
query "How can there be free will where there is such inevitable necessity?"
(2.15)
This shows how far Augustine has yet to go in solving the problem he
has set for himself. Yet commentators consistently focus on chapter 3 when
formulating Augustine's solution.22 William Rowe finds in chapter 4 a clue
that Augustine should have developed, but he sees in chapter 3 the line that
Augustine actually does develop.23 The same is true of William Craig, who
treats chapter 4 as a place for Augustine to tie up loose ends after the main
work has been done in chapter 3.24 Christopher Kirwan, in a book on
Augustine that pays special attention to issues surrounding the will and
explores the problem of theological fatalism at some length, manages to
keep chapter 4 out of it altogether.25 This can only result in a distorted view
of Augustine's solution.
The inadequacy in chapter 3 that leads Augustine to pursue the issue
into chapter 4 may have less to do with Augustine's conception of free will
than with the tests he deploys in that chapter. These tests, as we saw, are
unable to differentiate between cases of libertarian freedom and cases in
which the will itself (as opposed to outward action) is causally determined
or compelled. Augustine, however, rejects the latter possibility (at least for
the pure case of a will uncontaminated by sin, which is the context for the
discussion at the beginning of book 3). In De Libero Arbitήo, for example,
there is his argument in book 1 (11.75-76) that the mind cannot be
21. In chap. 2 what makes the problem merely aporetic is the requirements of
faith; in chap. 3, in contrast, it is the developing sense that—regardless of theologi-
cal commitments—there is just something very bizarre about the idea that fore-
knowledge should rule out free will. The modern debate has done nothing to
diminish this sense of bizarreness. Pike himself allows that the idea "has a sharp
counter-intuitive ring" ("Divine Foreknowledge," p. 27), and William Craig states
the point well in The Only Wise God: "No matter how ingenious the argument,
fatalism must be wrong. For it posits a constraint upon human freedom which is
altogether unintelligible. The fatalist admits that our decisions and actions may be
causally free—indeed, they could be utterly uncaused. Nevertheless, such actions
are said to be constrained—but by what? Fate? What in the world is that?" (Grand
Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1987), p. 69.
For more on the two apoήai, see the last section of my "Does Theological
Fatalism Rest on an Equivocation?" Ameήcan Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April 1995),
pp. 153-65.
22. A notable exception is David De Celles, "Divine Prescience and Human
Freedom in Augustine," Augustinian Studies 8 (1977): 151-60.
23. William Rowe, "Augustine on Foreknowledge and Free Will," Review of
Metaphysics 18 (December 1964): 356-63.
24. Craig, "Augustine on Foreknowledge," pp. 56-57.
25. Kirwan, Augustine, chap. 5.
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compelled by anything superior, equal, or inferior—the superior and equal
because they are too just to coerce the will, the inferior because it is too
weak. It is unclear whether this argument is supposed to rule out internal as
well as external compulsion. But in book 12 of De CivitateDei matters are less
ambiguous:
The bad will is the cause of the bad action, but nothing is the
efficient cause of the bad will. . . . For if two men, alike in physical and
moral constitution, see the same corporal beauty, and one of them is
excited by the sight to desire an illicit enjoyment while the other
steadfastly maintains a modest restraint of his will, what do we suppose
brings it about, that there is an evil will in the one and not in the other?
. . . For, not to delay on such a difficulty as this, if both are tempted
equally and one yields and consents to the temptation while the other
remains unmoved by it, what other account can we give of the matter
than this, that the one is willing, the other unwilling, to fall away from
chastity? And what causes this but their own wills, in cases at least such
as we are supposing, where the temperament is identical? The same
beauty was equally obvious to the eyes of both; the same secret tempta-
tion pressed on both with equal violence. However minutely we exam-
ine the case, therefore, we can discern nothing which caused the will
of the one to be evil. (12.6)
If anything, the stress here is on the similarity of inner conditions ("alike in
physical and moral constitution," "tempted equally," "identical tempera-
ment," "same beauty equally obvious," "same secret temptation pressed with
equal violence"), a similarity that precludes these conditions from explain-
ing the differential outcome.
Augustine's argument in book 1 may be unsound and his analysis in De
CivitateDei flawed. But whether or not he has come to this position honestly,
the fact that he has come to it means that he must explain how divine
foreknowledge can be compatible with uncompelled free will. Chapter 3 fails
to do this, but Augustine's argument is not on that account a failure since
it is not the job of chapter 3 to provide this explanation. That is the job of
chapter 4.
IV
Augustine begins chapter 4 by citing the "compulsion test" argued for in
book 1: "Will you deny that we sin by will and not under compulsion
[cogente] from anyone, either higher, lower, or equal?" (4.36). This test had
also been broached in chapter 1, though it was not completely clear at that
point how it fit in with the other tests for free will as they were being
marshaled against a naturally necessary W. It is not broached at all in
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chapter 3; in fact, the word 'compel' (Latin: cogo) and its cognates are
completely missing from the text in chapters 2-3. The fact that the "com-
pulsion test," which was trotted out during the examination of naturae suae
necessitate, is not brought into the examination of necesse enim certa until
chapter 4, is itself some reason to think that Augustine did not intend his
analysis in chapter 3 to be regarded as a complete defense of free choice in
the face of divine foreknowledge. A set of necessary conditions for free will
may be enough to show that free will is absent in particular cases, like that
of natural necessity, where one of the necessary conditions fails; but it is
insufficient to show that free will is present, as Augustine wishes to do in the
case of divine foreknowledge, unless the set is complete. Lack of compul-
sion provides the final necessary condition for free will as Augustine under-
stands it during this last phase of the discussion.
This is certainly closer to a libertarian conception than that which can
be gleaned from chapter 3, though a compatibilist could still accept it if
"compulsion" were hedged about with enough qualifiers (e.g., that it be
external to the agent). Augustine himself does enough hedging that, absent
passages like the one just cited from De CivitateDei, one could well conclude
with John Rist that Augustine "only recognizes external compulsion as
compulsion. What we should call psychological compulsions are not com-
pulsions for Augustine. They are simply the individual working out his own
nature."26 But even if this is largely true, there is no opportunity for such a
qualification to enter into the analysis in chapter 4. Whether or not
Augustine is himself soft on compatibilism, it would appear that foreknowl-
edge is unimplicated in any form of genuine compulsion, not just the
narrower forms recognized by soft determinists.
Following Evodius's statement of his remaining concerns, Augustine
begins his reply by asking whether the problem arises from foreknowledge
per se or from the fact that it is God's foreknowledge that is at issue. Evodius
indicates the latter; Augustine thinks otherwise:
A. If you foreknew that someone was going to sin, would it not
be necessary [necesse] for him to sin?
E. Yes, he would have to [necesse] sin, for my foreknowledge
would not be genuine unless I foreknew what was certain
[certa].
A. Then it is not because it is God's foreknowledge that what He
foreknew had to [necesse] happen, but only because it is fore-
knowledge. It is not foreknowledge if it does not foreknow
what is certain [ certa].
E. I agree. But why are you making these points?
A. Because unless I am mistaken, your foreknowledge that a man
will sin does not of itself necessitate [cogeres] the sin. Your fore-
knowledge did not force [ cogeret] him to sin even though he
26. Rist, "Augustine on Free Will," p. 422.
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was, without doubt [sine dubio], going to sin; otherwise you
would not foreknow that which was to be. Thus these two
things are not contradictories. As you, by your foreknowledge,
know what someone else is going to do of his own will, so God
forces [cogens] no one to sin; yet He foreknows those who will
sin by their own will.
Why cannot He justly punish what He does not force
[cogit] to be done, even though He foreknows it? Your recol-
lection of events in the past does not compel [ cogis] them to
occur. In the same way God's foreknowledge of future events
does not compel [cogit] them to take place. As you remember
certain things that you have done and yet have not done all
the things that you remember, so God foreknows all the
things of which He Himself is the Cause [auctor], and yet He
is not the Cause [auctor] of all that He foreknows. (4.38-40)
What do we learn from this? Foreknowledge entails necessity, in the sense
that what is foreknown has to happen, is certain, and will occur without doubt;
it does not entail necessity by compelling or causing what is foreknown.
Because it does not carry the latter implications, Augustine claims, it is not
in conflict with free choice of the will or with God's justice in punishing us
for the wrong use of the will.
Let us review the situation and how Augustine means to resolve it in
chapter 4. He argues in chapter 3 that there is a sense in which it is true
that
(PI) W is foreknown (by God) —> W is necessary,
and he establishes this as the canonical sense for purposes of examining the
argument. He then asks in chapter 4 whether it is in the same sense true
that
(P2.1) W is necessary -> W is compelled.
This question is important because Augustine is now adding to the three
tests employed in chapter 3 what I have called the "compulsion test":
(P2.2) W is compelled -» ~(W is voluntary).
Given that Augustine accepts (P2.2), if (P2.1) is also true, it follows that
(P2) is true; and given that Augustine accepts (PI) as well, it then follows
that theological fatalism is true. Augustine must therefore show that (P2.1)
is false. If he can do this, he will not only turn back an important argument
for (P2) but also show that (P2) is false. His title to this stronger conclusion
rests on the fact that (P2.2) is the fourth and last in a series of tests that are
severally necessary and jointly sufficient for W being voluntary. So W is
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necessary cannot entail ~(W is voluntary) without thereby entailing that at
least one of these tests is unsatisfied. But with respect to the first three tests,
as Augustine shows in chapter 3, there are no grounds for thinking that
necesse enim certa undermines voluntariness.27 If Augustine can show the
same for the fourth test, represented by (P2.2), it will follow that W is
voluntary even if divinely foreknown (and thus necessary). And this is
accomplished by showing that (P2.1) is false.
Suppose the only reason we have for thinking that W is compelled
derives from the fact that W is foreknown (by God). What could this reason
be? The first possibility to consider is that
(A) W is foreknown (by God) —> W is compelled (by God's fore-
knowledge) .
The idea that divine knowledge might itself cause or compel what it knows
seems implausible on its face, though it has not been entirely absent from
the twentieth-century debate. Douglas Lackey, for example, argues that the
divine case, no less than the human, presupposes a causal theory of knowl-
edge, and that this requires a causal chain from God's knowledge to the
foreknown event.28 Another strategy, discussed in Jonathan Kvanvig's book
The Possibility of an All-knowing God, rests on a conception of divine omnis-
cience under which p would be true were God to believe that p, and p would
be false were God not to believe that p—a formula which, on a counterfac-
tual analysis of causation like that of David Lewis, implies the causal depend-
ence of the state of affairs expressed by 'p ' on God's believing that p.29 As
for Augustine's reason for addressing (A), Jasper Hopkins appeals to
EvodruVs temptation "to picture God's foreknowledge as having some
causal effect upon human free choices—perhaps because, in general, he
pictures God as so very powerful."30 Alternatively, Evodius might find the
picture unattractive but also unavoidable inasmuch as he unreflectively
equates necessity with causal necessity and thinks himself stuck with the
latter once he admits the necesse enim certa of divine foreknowledge. Either
27. I think Augustine does show this. My earlier criticism (point 5 in sect. Ill)
assumed that Augustine's response in chap. 3 is complete and that the "power test"
therefore carries the whole modal load for free will. Once the "compulsion test" is
added to the mix, this criticism largely vanishes (leaving in its wake a purely
semantic question of whether the counterfactual analysis gives an accurate render-
ing of the word 'power').
28. Douglas Lackey, "A New Disproof of the Compatibility of Foreknowledge
and Free Choice," Religious Studies 10 (September 1974): 313-18. (But shouldn't
the causal chain go in the other direction?)
29. Library of Philosophy and Religion (Houndmills, U.K.: Macmillan, 1986).
Kvanvig's counterargument (p. 82) is that the converse of the counterfactuals also
holds, making the relation inappropriately symmetrical for one of causal depend-
ence.
30. Jasper Hopkins, "Augustine on Foreknowledge and Free Will," International
Journal for Philosophy ofReligion 8 (1977): 125.
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way, Augustine regards it as crucial to the case against (P2.1) that (A) be
defeated.
Augustine's argument against (A) in chapter 4 rests on a comparison
of divine with human knowledge. Letting 'F' abbreviate 'W is foreknown',
' C abbreviate 'W is caused or compelled', and Jones' stand for any hu-
man knower, we represent the argument as follows:
(la) [F (by God) -> C (by God's knowledge)] <-> [F (byJones) -»
C (byJones's knowledge)]
(2a) ~[F (byJones) -> C (byJones's knowledge)]
Λ ~[F (by God) -> C (by God's knowledge)].
(la) is intuitively attractive in its own right, but Augustine provides an
implicit argument on its behalf. The logic of knowledge should be the same
whether the knower is human or divine. If divine foreknowledge did com-
pel what it foreknows, it must be in virtue of its certainty: its necesse enim certa.
But human foreknowledge is also certain (otherwise it would not qualify as
knowledge). Thus the two foreknowledges, however different in other re-
spects, are alike when it comes to the characteristic relevant to compulsion.
It is therefore rational to regard (la) as true. As for (2a), Augustine is so
sure that Evodius would assent to it that he doesn't even offer him the ritual
opportunity to do so. And indeed it is only in the most contrived case that
(2a) might turn out false. This disposes of (A).31
Of course, the fact that God's foreknowledge does not compel me to
sin would not of itself show that I am blameworthy unless nothing else
compelled me either. But suppose foreknowledge to be impossible except
insofar as my actions are compelled by prior conditions; that is,
(B) W is foreknown (by God) —> W is compelled (by something).
If (B) were true, foreknowledge would be incompatible with uncompelled
free will even though it is not foreknowledge that is doing the compelling.
Richard Swinburne, for example, maintains that when a knower holds a
belief about the future, if nothing is present to the knower that causally
guarantees the believed state of affairs, the belief can only be true as a
matter of luck, not knowledge.52 This would be the case whether the knower
is human or divine. Martin Davies calls this the "causal-epistemological"
version of theological fatalism and claims that Boethius had it as his main
concern.
3 3
 Boethius, of course, addresses the concern by rejecting the
31. A plausible extension of the argument yields the broader conclusion,
endorsed elsewhere, that W is not even explanatorily dependent on God's foreknowl-
edge of W. See, for example, De CivitateDei 5.10: "For a man does not therefore sin
because [quia] God foreknew that he would sin."
32. Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism, Clarendon Library of Logic and
Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), chap. 10.
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predictive model of foreknowledge that underlies it, replacing it with a
timeless vision of (what from our perspective is) the future. Augustine is also
concerned with the causal-epistemological problem and responds to it with
an alternate model of divine knowledge. Elsewhere the model is much like
the Boethian; but in De Libero Arbitήo 3.4, his response is drawn from an
ordinary example of human cognition.
In selecting the example, Augustine cannot proceed exactly as he did
against (A) because the corresponding comparison of divine to human
foreknowledge—
(lb*) [F (by God) -> C (by something)] <-> [F (byJones) -> C (by
something) ]
—is dubious. Whereas my foreknowledge of someone else's action might not
compel or cause that action, it may seem that human beings cannot achieve
foreknowledge except in cases in which some present factor, accessible to
present knowledge, is operating to compel or cause the foreknown action.
Since compulsion is acknowledged by Augustine to be inimical to free will,
this would mean that human foreknowledge is possible only under condi-
tions in which free will is in fact excluded. That Augustine does indeed take
this view is suggested by his discussion of foreknowledge in Confessions 11.1834
and by the infallibilist position on knowledge that he adopts in our text ("my
foreknowledge would not be genuine unless I foreknew what was certain"). It
is plausible to suppose that I cannot know infallibly what someone else will do
of his or her own free will. If I can be said to know that my wife will choose the
pecan pie, this must be on a less stringent account of knowledge than an
infallibilist could accept; but I can still have infallible foreknowledge (more
or less) of what is not subject to her will—for example, that she is about to hit
the floor (since she is presently falling from the stepladder). My foreknowl-
edge does not cause or compel what it foreknows, but it can foreknow only
what is caused or compelled. So the comparison with human foreknowledge
does not seem to get the situation with divine foreknowledge quite right since
Augustine clearly holds that God can know the future whether or not it is
caused or compelled.
It is the ineffectiveness of (lb*) that explains why, having begun by
comparing divine foreknowledge to human foreknowledge, Augustine sud-
33. Davies, "Boethius and Others," pp. 327-29.
34. "When, therefore, they say that things future are seen, it is not themselves,
which as yet are not (that is, which are future); but their causes or their signs
perhaps are seen, which already are." For references to further texts, see Hopkins,
"Augustine on Foreknowledge," who argues that the thought experiment in which
Evodius is asked to suppose that he foreknows W is purely counterpossible:
"Augustine does not believe that any human being has foreknowledge of another's
free choice—except in the rare case where this knowledge has been revealed to him
by God" (p. 124).
AUGUSTINE ON THEOLOGICAL FATALISM 23
denly switches to a comparison to human memory. Let 'R' stand for 'W is
remembered.' The counterargument to (B) then goes like this:
(lb) [F (by God) -> C (by something)] <-> [R (byJones) ->
C (by something) ]
(2b) ~[R (byJones) -> C (by something)]
Λ ~[F (by God) -* C (by something)].
The second premise of the argument is again beyond dispute. As for (lb),
it presupposes a particular way that divine foreknowledge operates, one in
which the logical and chronological orders diverge. In the words of David
De Celles, 'Though God infallibly knows what a man will decide before he
decides it, yet nonetheless, His knowledge depends upon that decision."35
God's knowledge, we might say, is upstream of W in the order of time but
downstream of W in the order of explanation. If God's beliefs about future
events depend on those events, His beliefs may be accounted for inde-
pendently of His awareness of conditions causally determining the events.
In that case there is no more reason to assume causally necessitating
conditions than there is in the case of human memories, which also depend
on the remembered events. Not only is there nothing present to the remem-
berer that causes the remembered event, but there is nothing present to the
rememberer from which the rememberer infers the remembered event:
human memory is not retrodiction, as divine foreknowledge is not predic-
tion. On this model of God's foreknowledge, (lb) is true. As long as there
are no crippling objections to that model, Augustine is within his rights in
rejecting (B).3 6
There may be some question whether the critical feature of this
model—the explanatory dependence of foreknowledge on the fore-
known—is consistent with what Augustine says elsewhere. In the Confessions,
for example, we find Augustine entertaining another model, this one also
inspired by the case of human memory. After noting that memory involves
a mental image by which something from the past is perceived in the
present, he adds,
Whether there be a like cause of foretelling future things, so that of
things which as yet are not the images may be perceived as already
35. De Celles, "Divine Prescience," p. 160.
36. Perhaps the most salient objection is that the model presupposes a B-theory
of time. Whether it does, as well as whether its doing so is objectionable, is too large
an issue to address here, though I briefly defend the propriety of drawing on the
B-theory when responding to theological fatalism in my "Does Theological Fatalism
Rest on an Equivocation?"
Notice that the shift in cognitive model does not undermine the case against
(A) since human memory has just as much title to knowledge (and thus to cer-
tainty) as has human foreknowledge. But the case of human memory illustrates
more clearly than the case of human foreknowledge the relations of dependence
that do (and do not) link divine foreknowledge with what God foreknows.
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existing, I confess, my God, I know not. This certainly I know, that we
generally think before on our future actions, and that this premedita-
tion is present; but that the action on which we premeditate is not yet,
because it is future. . . . (11.18)
On this "premeditation" model, someone knows the future by knowing his
own intentions for future action. If Christopher Kirwan is to be believed,
the same idea may be found in De Civitate Dei book 5, where a crucial
assumption of the Stoic argument Augustine is addressing "is that universal
knowledge of the future comes not by foreseeing how things will be, but
only by deciding or ordaining how things shall be."37 Applied to God, the
"premeditation" model suggests a further consideration in favor of (P2.1),
namely,
(C) W is foreknown (by God) —> W is compelled (by God).
Here it is neither God's foreknowledge, as in (A), nor something outside God,
as in (B), but God Himself who compels the foreknown event (and does so
as a necessary condition of foreknowing it).
Is there any evidence that Augustine accepts the "premeditation"
model, thereby incurring an obligation to respond to (C)? Nothing in his
rebuttal of theological fatalism in De CivitateDei suggests that he agrees with
the Stoics on this point, and the passage from the Confessions is clearly
considering possibilities for human foreknowledge rather than proposing a
model for divine foreknowledge. Better evidence of the "premeditation"
model at work might be sought in De Tήnitate, where Augustine writes,
"God is not acquainted with any of his creatures, whether spiritual or
corporeal, because they are, but they are because he is acquainted with
them. For he did not lack knowledge of the things he was to create; he
created, therefore, because he knew, not knew because he created"
(15.13.22). Here, however, he is talking about the existence of creatures, not
the particular facts about what they freely do. We know that God cannot be
causative for everything He knows if only because some of what He knows
is evil: Ή e can foreknow even those things which he himself does not do,
such as whatever sins there may be."38 Such knowledge is simply unavailable
under the "premeditation" model. All in all, I see no reason to doubt
Augustine's seriousness in proposing that future acts of will escape freedom-
annihilating compulsion because divine foreknowledge operates like "re-
37. Kirwan, Augustine, p. 100. But Kirwan seems to me to be overreading the
text: the Stoic assumption is surely (B), not (C).
38. De Praedestinatione Sanctorum 10.19. See also Tractatus in foannis Evangelium
53.4: "The Lord, as prescient of things future, did by the Prophet predict the
unbelief of the Jews; predict, however, not cause. For it does not follow that the Lord
compels any man to sin, because He knows already men's future sins. . . . If they
had wished to do not evil, but good, they would not have been hindered. . . . "
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verse memory." This is perfectly compatible with God's creative and provi-
dential endeavors requiring a complex interplay between foreknowledge
and agency in which much of the future is also available to Him through
premeditation.39
Before concluding this section, I should say something about the
absence in 3.1-4 of any appeal to "timeless eternity" as the proper mode of
divine existence. Augustine, after all, endorses this conception of God
elsewhere.40 Since this gives him the resources for a "Boethian" response to
the problem, it may seem that he has missed a golden opportunity in
neglecting to avail himself of those resources when addressing the argu-
ment for theological fatalism; at the very least, it is surprising that he does
not even correct the argument's assumption (erroneous from an atem-
poralist standpoint) that God knows what will happen beforehand. The puz-
zle of how Augustine's response to theological fatalism fits in with what he
says elsewhere about God's relation to time—a puzzle that confronts any-
one who attempts to make sense out of Augustine's position in our pas-
sage—has a neat solution on the interpretation I have been offering. If free
will, while excluding causal determinism and compulsion, is nevertheless
compatible with divine foreknowledge because the latter necessitates with-
out causing or compelling what it foreknows, presumably free will would be
compatible with divine timeless knowledge for the same reason. In either
case, God's knowledge does not cause or compel what it knows. This is
Augustine's basic explanation for why divine knowledge is benign in its
effects on free will, and the explanation applies whether or not God exists
in time. Since the argument's assumption that God exists and knows in time
is not part of what makes the argument go wrong, there is no need for
Augustine to correct this assumption in offering his own solution to the
problem. Were he to correct it, he would still have to explain how God's
timeless knowledge is compatible with free will, and this explanation would
not differ in any essential respects from the one he actually offers in
response to the conventional formulation of theological fatalism in terms
of divine /or<?knowledge. If I have understood Augustine's position correctly,
introducing divine atemporalism into the discussion in chapters 1-4 would
be irrelevant to the points at issue there and simply delay arrival at the real
solution to the problem.
Augustine is evidently satisfied with what he has accomplished in chap-
ter 4 because his response to Evodius's aporia ends at that point. And what
39. Against the common objection that complete foreknowledge stultifies
rather than abets providential agency, see my Όmniprescient Agency," Religious
Studies 28 (September 1992): 351-69; "Divine Providence and Simple Foreknowl-
edge," Faith and Philosophy 10 (July 1993): 394-414; "Prescience and Providence: A
Reply to My Critics," Faith and Philosophy 10 (July 1993): 430-40; and "The Compati-
bility of Omniscience and Intentional Action: A Reply to Tomis Kapitan," forthcom-
ing in Religious Studies.
40. For example, Confessions bk. 11, De Trinitate bk. 15, Ad Simplicianum de
Diversis Quaestionibus 2.2.2.
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has he accomplished? First, he makes up for the anemic "power test" of
chapter 3 by adding a robust "compulsion test," one that (in conjunction with
the three tests from chap. 3) is finally sufficient for free will. He then turns
back two challenges to W's freedom based on the compulsion test: (A) on
grounds of rank implausibility, (B) because it overlooks the dependence of
God's foreknowledge on the future event. With no other plausible chal-
lenges on the horizon, Augustine concludes that necesse enim certa does not
involve compulsion. Since the other tests were already satisfied in chapter 3,
free will escapes unscathed from the threat of theological fatalism.
In sum, Augustine's response to the argument for theological fatalism
is to affirm (PI) and deny (P2), the denial resting on an analysis of free will
under which it is jeopardized only by a necessity stronger than that gener-
ated by divine foreknowledge. Whether this assessment entitles Augustine
to a place of honor alongside others who have taken the measure of
theological fatalism is, of course, another question. Settling this question
requires situating Augustine's contribution in the context of the current
debate.
V
There are two basic reasons for doubting whether Augustine's argument
against theological fatalism is relevant to the contemporary, Pikean version
of the problem. Since these reasons correspond to the argument's two
premises, I take them in that order.
The first reason rests on doubts about whether Augustine's sense of
necessity is sufficiently similar to Pike's to make his solution transferrable.
I have said almost nothing about the kind of necessity that Augustine
associates with divine foreknowledge, other than to note some of the ex-
pressions by which Augustine refers to it (such as necesse enim certa) and to
distinguish it from natural and causal necessity. But commentators who get
as far as chapter 4 tend to regard it as a conditional necessity (Rowe and Craig
are examples). The expression "If P, necessarily Q," can be read as either
"P —» DQ" or "D(P —•> Q) " On the first reading necessity attaches directly
to the simple proposition Q (given P), whereas on the second it attaches only
to the conditional linking P and Q. On the view we are considering, then,
(PI) expresses nothing more than the conditional necessity: D(W is
foreknown (by God) —> W will obtain). And then the problem of theological
fatalism is quickly solved by pointing out that only simple necessity, not
mere conditional necessity, is inimical to free will and that (P2) is therefore
false.
In contrast, the necessity at work in Pike's argument is a form of simple
necessity, namely, "accidental necessity" or (my preferred term) "temporal
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necessity." Its primary instance is past events, which are necesary in the
sense that they are now unavoidable. There may have been a time when
they were avoidable (when they still lay in the future), but they are not
avoidable now. The future may be temporally contingent, or "open," but the
past is temporally necessary, or "closed." No one—not even God—can do
anything about it now. The secondary instance of temporal necessity is
future events that are entailed by past events, for these are no more avoid-
able than are the past events that entail them. Since temporal necessity is
relative to times (one and the same event may be temporally contingent at
a time prior to its occurrence but temporally necessary at a time posterior
to its occurrence), let us use the symbol 'D t ' to designate temporal necessity,
with V indexing the time with respect to which the event in question is
temporally necessary. Then Pike's version of the argument has the follow-
ing form, where t is the present, P is God's knowing yesterday that you will
perform a certain action tomorrow, Qis your performing that action tomor-
row, and R is your performing of that action freely:
(PI) P ^ Π tQ
(P2)D tQ->~R
Λ P -> ~R.
Pike's reason for thinking (PI) to be true is that God's foreknowledge of
your future action belongs to the past and so is temporally necessary relative
to the present; but since God is essentially omniscient, His believing that
you will perform this action entails that you will perform it. This transfers
the temporal necessity from God's past belief to your future action, and
(PI) is therefore true. Augustine's critique of conditional necessity leaves
this version of the argument untouched.
The problem with this objection is that its interpretation of Augustine's
argument is unconvincing. First, there is little evidence in the text of a scope
ambiguity, or of Augustine's resolution of it in favor of conditional neces-
sity.41 His own summary of the argument for theological fatalism at the
beginning of chapter 3 refers to the necessity engendered by God's fore-
knowledge as fixed and inevitable. This is not only hard to understand as a
conditional necessity but also strongly suggests the very kind of simple
necessity at work in Pike's argument: temporal necessity.
Second, the interpretation can find no support in the famous passage
in De Civitate Dei where Augustine distinguishes between a necessity that
threatens free will but which foreknowledge does not entail and a necessity
that foreknowledge does entail but which does not threaten free will. On
the Craig-Rowe reading, the latter, harmless necessity should be conditional
necessity; but that's not how Augustine characterizes it. It is, he says, the
necessity according to which "it is necessary for something to be as it is, or
41. Cf. Hopkins, "Augustine on Foreknowledge," pp. 116-17.
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happen as it does," and he gives as examples the necessity by which it is
"necessary for God to live forever and to foreknow all things" and "neces-
sary, when we exercise will, to do so of our own free will." Now it is true that
there are de dicto necessities connected with both of Augustine's examples.
The proposition "God is indestructible and omniscient" is necessarily true
since anyone not indestructible and omniscient would not count as God; so
is "any exercise of will is an exercise of free will" since (in Augustine's
idiolect) it would not count as will if it were not free. But this does not mean
that this second harmless variety is de dicto since there are de re necessities
here as well. The divine attributes are de re essential to God. Likewise,
though a particular bachelor is not essentially unmarried (the connection
here being merely de dicto), a particular act of willing, like W, is essentially
free. There is no indication that Augustine thought divine foreknowledge
compatible with these necessities in virtue of their being merely conditional
or de dicto.
Third, what has most attracted critics to the scope ambiguity interpre-
tation is Augustine's comparison of divine to human foreknowledge in
chapter 4. The point of comparison seems to be that O(X knows that p D
p), whether X is divine or human. But then the necessity Augustine is
assuming must be merely conditional. This evidence fails, however, if the
point of the comparison is different, as I argued earlier when we examined
that passage. My suggestion, again, is that Augustine thinks humans know
the future only when the future is compelled or causally necessary. It is this
difference between divine and human foreknowledge that leads him to drop
the comparison with human foreknowledge for a comparison with human
memory. If Augustine errs in attributing the same logic to divine and
human knowledge, it is not because he ascribes to divine foreknowledge
nothing more than the conditional necessity by which human foreknowl-
edge is connected with truth but because he asserts in the human case the
same unconditional necessity that attaches to foreknown events in the
divine case.
Finally, the solution Augustine actually offers is not the minimal one
needed to solve a problem generated by mere conditional necessity. His
position is that necessity invalidates free will only if the necessity is causal in
nature or at least makes the will explanatorily dependent on something
outside the agent's power. But not only does conditional necessity fail to
generate either form of necessity, temporal necessity fails to do so as well.
If Augustine is right about this, both resolutions of the scope ambiguity are
encompassed by his solution. This suggests either that he did not in fact
understand the problem as resting on a scope ambiguity or that his solution
is more powerful than he realized. In either case the contemporary rele-
vance of Augustine's analysis is unaffected.
So much for the first reason why Augustine's solution may seem discon-
nected from current debates over theological fatalism. The second is that,
if he does indeed interpret "necessary" to include the temporally necessary,
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his rejection of (P2) marks him as a compatibilist. But Pike's argument is
not devised to raise a problem for compatibilistic freedom, only for libertar-
ian freedom. It is commitment to libertarian freedom that has made (P2)
more or less sacrosanct in the contemporary discussion and focused critical
acumen onto (PI). Augustine's solution is an end run around libertarian
freedom, making it no more instructive for philosophers interested in
solving the Pikean problem than one that throws out another puzzle condi-
tion such as divine omniscience.
Is Augustine's solution acceptable only to a compatibilist? That's not at
all clear. We saw that Augustine is an zncompatibilist with respect to natural
necessity in chapter 1; more relevantly, we saw that he is an mcompatibilist
with respect to causal necessity in chapter 4. But we also saw that he is a
compatibilist with respect to temporal necessity in chapter 4, inasmuch as an
action that is temporally necessary without being causally necessary is not
thereby precluded from satisfying the conditions for free will. It makes little
sense, then, to ask whether Augustine is a compatibilist tout court, nor is it
at all obvious that the respect in which he is a compatibilist debars him from
being a libertarian as well. Even if his final position on the will makes him
a soft determinist (or worse), his analysis of the problem of theological
fatalism does not presuppose such a low view of human capacities.
A libertarianism that accepts compatibilism with respect to temporal
necessity, while remaining incompatibilist with respect to causal necessity, is
appealing quite apart from the theistic motive to reconcile human freedom
with divine foreknowledge. A related problem in philosophical theology, for
example, is how divine omnipotence is to be squared with essential good-
ness. The fact that I am capable of sinning, while for God this is metaphysi-
cally impossible, should not have as a consequence that God is in this
respect less powerful or free than I am. Further, God's situation here may
just be the limit case of a range that includes human acts that are psycho-
logically impossible (e.g., my intentionally torturing my daughter to death)
but that do not seem best understood as limits on our powerΛ^ Seeing how
this consequence can be avoided, in both the divine and human cases,
might also help us see how I could have the libertarian power to do what is
temporally impossible.
Another reason for doubting whether libertarianism is inconsistent
with temporal necessity, this time having nothing to do with theological
commitments, arises from Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the "princi-
ple of alternate possibilities." Suppose Jones intentionally murders Smith,
with all the circumstances of the case satisfying the most demanding liber-
tarian strictures but with this one exception: that a device implanted in his
42. Thomas Talbott is particularly good on this question. For the divine case,
see his O n the Divine Nature and the Nature of Divine Freedom," Faith and
Philosophy 5 (January 1988): 3-24; for the human case, see "On Free Agency and the
Concept of Power," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (September 1988): 241-54.
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brain would have compelled Jones to murder Smith if he had not decided
to do so of his own volition. In such cases, Frankfurt writes, there are
circumstances that make it impossible for a person to avoid performing
some action without those circumstances in any way bringing it about
that he performs that action. It would surely be no good for the person
to refer to circumstances of this sort in an effort to absolve himself of
moral responsibility for performing the action in question. For those
circumstances, by hypothesis, actually had nothing to do with his hav-
ing done what he did. He would have done precisely the same thing . .
. even if they had not prevailed.43
Frankfurt himself draws a compatibilist moral from such cases, but others
have seen in them the basis for a modified libertarianism that abandons
alternate possibilities while retaining causal indeterminism.4 4 If the latter is
a defensible position,45 divine foreknowledge presents us with Frankfurt-
type cases of libertarian free will in which alternatives to W are temporally
impossible but the circumstances that render them impossible do nothing
to explain why W occurs:46 as Augustine notes, "A man does not therefore
sin because God foreknew that he would sin."47
Perhaps the most important question bequeathed to libertarians by
Augustine's analysis of theological fatalism is whether the freedom worth
having is compatible with temporal necessity when it is not causally determi-
native. Recent work on theological fatalism simply assumes that libertarians
must answer in the negative.48 Augustine's De Libero Arbitήo suggests—cor-
rectly, in my view—that the assumption is worth reexamining.
43. Harry Frankfurt, "Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility," Jour-
nal of Philosophy 46 (1969): 837.
44. For example, Eleonore Stump, "Intellect, Will, and the Principle of Alter-
nate Possibilities," in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy, ed., Michael
Beaty (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1990): pp. 254-85. Stump's
own positive account of incompatibilist free will comes remarkably close to the
fourfold test employed by Augustine in De Libero Arbitήo 3.3-4, though her interests
in this essay lead her instead to develop a connection with Thomas Aquinas.
45. An important threat to its defensibility may be found in John Martin
Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will (Oxford, U.K. and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell,
1994), where it is argued that the abandonment of alternate possibilities undercuts
any motive for retaining causal indeterminism as a requirement of moral responsi-
bility. William Hasker has made the same claim in correspondence. I intend to
address this point on another occasion when I can give it the attention it deserves.
46.1 defend divine foreknowledge as a source of Frankfurt-type counterexam-
ples to the principle of alternate possibilities in my "Frankfurt Counterexamples:
Some Comments on the Widerker-Fischer Debate," forthcoming in Faith and Phi-
losophy.
47. De CivitateDei 5.10.
48. One exception to this claim is Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, who in The
Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991),
chap. 6, sect. 2.1, applies to the problem of theological fatalism a Frankfurt-type
skepticism regarding the principle of alternate possibilities.
